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Prior to Viktor Yushchenko, elections did
nothing more than switch around the
people in power, without altering the
system of state administration. That is why
all the people who had access to
information about his goals supported 
Mr. Yushchenko. He promised to put an end
to corruption, to make government
transparent, to make government officials
accountable, and to ensure every citizen
democratic rights and freedoms. 
Mr. Yushchenko ostensibly promised to
institute radical reforms in the hopelessly
ineffective and corrupted leftover soviet
system of public governance.
So what do we have today? Are our
expectations for all&encompassing,
irreversible democratic transformations
being fulfilled? What does this depend on?
Will they ever be fulfilled?
Unthinkable concepts, 
undivided leadership
The country’s new political leadership is
doing things that were once unthinkable: 
it is talking about the real problems of real
life and is genuinely concerned about truly
national state interests. With this behavior,
the country’s new political leaders are
destroying the sacred law of the
totalitarian, closed soviet system of
governing, where real interests, real
competition, real decisions were always
hidden behind closed doors. Instead, all
public declarations about interests and the
problems of the nation and the country
were inevitably pure fiction, mere
camouflage.
The country’s new top leadership is
undivided, and for this reason, it is
exceptionally effective at the political level
in those areas that were part of the
election platform: eliminating corruption
and integrating into Europe. Today’s
foreign policy is frankly inspiring: Ukraine
is transforming from a complete zero to a
strong player on the world stage before our
very eyes. All the anti&corruption talk
inspires trust and an uplifting feeling. 
“Can this possibly be happening?”
De&sovietization without
reinforcement
Unfortunately, the brilliant success of the
democratic behavior of Ukraine’s current
political elite and its persuasive public 
de&sovietization are not supported by any
evidence of success—or at least of some
understandable intentions—in terms of
organization. So far, there is no evidence
at all of a capacity for organizational or
administrative (bureaucratic)
transformation of the government
machine, that is, its functional de&
sovietization. This incapacity of the
Government to organize itself in terms 
of carrying out the serious reform of 
de&sovietization could result in the
collapse of the revolutionary wave 
of democratization.
If truth be told, the soviet government
machine was the ideal administrative and
bureaucratic tool to carry out a top&down
system of government. Political
competition happened only behind closed
doors. The winners always represented the
same interest group, while their rivals were
always declared enemies of the people and
destroyed. There was no question of any
public political competition. Moreover,
decisions could be initiated only at the top
of the heap and the implementation of
such decisions happened by fiat from the
top, down the entire chain of command.
Professional and experienced as they were,
soviet bureaucrats could not even imagine
the kind of dissidence inherent in the
concepts of “analysis of possible
consequences of political decisions” or
“impact assessment of political decisions.”
Not only words, but deeds
Today’s political leadership swears entirely
by its own political will and expects its
word to be enough to reach the goals
written into the president’s and
Government’s programs. In just one
example, the Minister of Health recently
wrote a letter to oblast administrations,
either exhorting them or commanding
them to “ensure free access to medical
services,” to “change the status of local
general practitioners to that of family
doctors,” and to “report in 10 days on the
results.”
Without any doubt, this kind of soviet
behavior on the part of current Cabinet
members rouses fear of what lies further,
not only for democracy but for Ukraine as 
a whole. How on earth can we expect the
campaign promises to be fulfilled when
there is an impression that the Government
simply does not understand the immense
chasm between what is said at the highest
political level and what is actually done at
the bureaucratic level?
Moreover, decisions are not institutional,
that is, they are not grounded in any
analysis of the roots of problems or of
possible consequences, they are not
coordinated with the actions of other
ministries, especially the Ministry of
Finance, they do not anticipate any
obstacles, and they are not supported by
any real resources.
Lifting yourself by your own
bootstraps?
The de&sovietization of the government
bureaucracy—what does this mean?
First of all, public documents, programs and
plans must stop being mere formalized
ideological smokescreens and be developed
as real, effective political instruments that
can ensure that politicians understand fully
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their accountability for the consequences
of any decisions that they make. Strategy
needs to present a precise picture of the
relationship between goals and resources
or obstacles—not an encyclopedia of
dreams of happiness.
Secondly, the new bureaucracy needs to
analyze all interests that are affected by
any proposed policy, including business
interests and real political interests in the
struggle for power. Without this kind of
analysis, there is no chance for the
Government to effectively plan actions that
will inevitably rouse opposition and to
formulate arguments to counter it.
Thirdly, a new system of approving and
implementing decisions needs to be
established in order for the government to
be both transparent and accountable. Top&
down orders worked poorly, sometimes not
at all, even under Leonid Kuchma. Today,
when competition has become totally
legitimized, fundamentally new approaches
and skills need to be developed. In the first
place, policy analysis, policy coordination
and change management are urgently
needed now. The Ukrainian Government’s
problem is not bureaucrats but the
structures, processes, standards and habits
that formed the old bureaucratic system.
The bureaucrat cannot by nature be a
revolutionary. Only Baron Munchausen was
able to raise himself up by his own
bootstraps. The rules of the game, duties,
norms, and requirements need to change—
and only then will it be evident who is a
good bureaucrat, and who a bad one.
Fourthly, the new Government needs new
administrative capacities in order to ensure
meaningful political discourse. It needs to
turn to its citizens not only as political
personalities on television, but in public
documents that raise vital issues in state
policy and allow voters to understand why
the Government intends to institute a
particular change, which problems it
considers an absolute priority, and which
steps it intends to take to resolve them.
The use of Green and White Papers to
establish two&way communication between
the Government and its citizens and ensure
conscious support of its policies on the
part of voters is common in developed
democracies such as the European Union
and many other countries.
The real thing or yet another
facsimile?
Can these urgent changes take place? What
will happen if they don’t? These changes
could take place for two reasons. Firstly,
there has been a good deal of technical
assistance in the years since Ukraine
became independent and many government
people were able to learn from it—even
though change did not happen for lack of
political will. Secondly, the essence of
radical administrative reform, of de&
sovietization, lies in the simple act of
stopping the mindless activity of
generating ideological smokescreens and
instead injecting some basic common
sense into the activities of the government
machine. This is possible because the
country’s highest political leadership is
already doing this at its own level—with
great success.
The risk is that yet another soviet facsimile
of publicness is being created: the new
community councils and collegia that are
“about everything” resemble nothing so
much as the public soviet reports once
provided by the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 
They lack structure, both in relation to
government policy, and in relation to
interest groups or stakeholders. Members 
of the Government are physically unable 
to cope with the endless stream of ideas,
topics, recommendations and critiques 
that accumulate at such gatherings.
The risk lies not in that the Government
will place the task before itself to be
transparent and public, but that it will
abandon itself through inertia to the
momentum of the existing machine and
resort to hand management instead.
Without clear, straightforward, meaningful
documents about its policies, the
Government will look ever more
unsystematic, it will be less and less able
to speak with one voice, and it will
become more and more necessary for it to
issue policy documents in a format that is
not available for public scrutiny. Voters
will find themselves gradually becoming
disillusioned and frustrated because it will
become impossible for them to understand
or predict the actions of their
government.
This risk is enormous also because most
representatives of the winning team have
understood the victory of the Orange
Revolution not as a victory for democracy,
but as a victory of specific individuals who
happened to work in Nasha Ukraina during
the presidential campaign. Many of these
people are not even thinking about any
kind of new, democratic behavior on the
part of the current Administration. For
them, power is power, as it always was—
what else is there? And what were they
fighting for, anyway? Will the winning team
be capable of sacrificing the comfortable,
protective traditional prerogatives of power
for the sake of a complete transformation
of the system?
Confident optimism
Today, there are independent think&tanks
that analyze both public policy and the
commitment of the new government. How
can this invaluable resource be tapped fully
on behalf of irreversible democracy in
Ukraine?
The readiness of the new government to
act publicly needs to be transformed into 
a bureaucratic process of consultation with
interest groups and stakeholders that is
mandatory for all government bodies with
regard to those kinds of internal
government documents that require
analysis of the impact of proposed
decisions, predictions of the response of
affected interest groups, and propositions
for Government action.
This orientation towards results rather than
the mindless monopoly on noisy inaction
will make the efforts of non&government
organizations both wanted and needed. It
is precisely think&tanks that are capable of
transforming the shiny public presence of
the government on television screens into
a meaningful public dialog. Those who
have taken the lead, who have great
resources and whose ideas are far&reaching
are especially important. It is critical that
the powerful Razumkov Center, for
instance, not be swallowed up by the
Defense Ministry. The Yalta European
Seminar organized by Viktor Pinchuk raised
great hopes and it would be an enormous
loss if Mr. Pinchuk’s behavior during the
election killed any further social
contribution of his.
History is harsh. Every epoch requires
completely different actions and different
talents. For Ukraine, it would be a tragic
mistake to sacrifice the future out of
gratitude to the past.
In Ukraine today there are already many
winners in the struggle for survival among
policy centers. Together with the
government and the opposition, we need to
establish a winning social discourse around
strategic issues in the country’s state
policy.
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